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WAGENHEIM.APPENDIX

THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF
NEUROSCIENCE EXPERT
TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL
LITIGATION
JAMIE WAGENHEIM*
Neuroscience has the potential to significantly impact civil and criminal
litigation.1 Attorneys have successfully used neuroscience evidence to demonstrate
that a client had an inability to form the requisite intent for a particular crime, 2 that
a child‘s violence resulted from his experiences playing graphic video games, 3 and
that brain deficiencies vitiated an assailant‘s self control.4 Not all state and federal
courts readily accept neuroscience evidence, instead applying their respective state
and federal rules of evidence on the admissibility of expert testimony with varying
degrees of stringency.5 Even states applying identical evidentiary standards have
taken different approaches to the admissibility of neuroscience evidence. 6 For
neuroscience evidence to reach its full potential, the state and federal courts must

Copyright © 2012 by Jamie Wagenheim.
* J.D. and Health Law Certificate Candidate, 2012, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School
of Law (Baltimore, MD); B.A., 2009, Government and Politics, University of Maryland (College Park,
MD); B.A., 2009, History, University of Maryland (College Park, MD). The author wishes to thank
Professor Amanda Pustilnik for her guidance with this Comment, the editorial staff of The Journal of
Health Care Law & Policy for their assistance, and her family for their support and encouragement.
1. See Joshua Greene & Jonathon Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC.1775, 1775 (2004) (―[N]euroscience will challenge
and ultimately reshape our intuitive sense(s) of justice. New neuroscience will affect the way we view
the law . . . .‖).
2. See New York v. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (using neuroscience to
argue that a brain defect prevented a husband from forming the requisite intent to strangle his wife and
throw her out of a window twelve stories above the ground).
3. Entertainment Software Ass'. v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(arguing that graphic video games cause children to behave aggressively).
4. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 11, 2007, at 49 (describing
the popularity of Daniel Martell‘s litigation consulting business, Forensic Neuroscience, where he has
testified in hundreds of civil and criminal cases on neuroscience issues, including the use of brain scans
to argue that a neurological impairment prevented litigants from exercising self-control).
5. See Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶ 26 (2009), http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/jones-brain-imaging.pdf (noting that
scientific evidence standards differ between states).
6. See infra Part II.
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apply evidentiary rules uniformly in order to establish a consistent, predictable
standard.
Part I of this paper will discuss the Federal Rules of Evidence on expert
testimony and the revolutionary Supreme Court case that redefined the Federal
Rules, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.7 Part II will examine Quick v.
State8 and U.S. v. Scott,9 two recent criminal cases from two different courts
applying the Daubert standard. Each court applied the evidentiary rules differently
in determining whether to admit neuroscience evidence that supported similar
exculpatory arguments regarding the requisite intent to commit murder and assault,
respectively.10 Finally, Part III will analyze the Daubert ruling‘s effect on the
admissibility of scientific evidence and reasons for the variation in the treatment of
similar neuroscience testimony in different courts applying comparable evidentiary
standards, particularly in the recent context of the Quick and Scott rulings.
I. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE ON EXPERT TESTIMONY
Expert testimony has faced criticism since at least the nineteenth century. 11
Judge Learned Hand, discontent with the increasing frequency of highly
credentialed experts offering completely polarized opinions on the stand,
questioned, ―[H]ow can the jury judge between two statements each founded upon
an experience admittedly foreign in kind to their own?‖12
Fifty years prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals established the first uniform federal standard
for the admissibility of expert testimony in Frye v. United States.13 In Frye, the
Court excluded testimony regarding a new systolic blood pressure test designed to
detect falsehood because the expert testimony attempted to prematurely introduce
an underdeveloped principle.14 The Court then established what became known as
the ―Frye rule‖ in holding that ―while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.‖15 Courts

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
No. 01-09-01127-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680 (Tex. App. Jan. 27, 2011).
No. CR-09-0131-EFS, 2011 WL 1327033 (E.D. Wash. April 7, 2011).
See infra Part II.
Lee Loevinger, Science as Evidence, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 153, 154 (1994).
Learned Hand, Expert Testimony, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding, 15
HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1902).
13. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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followed Frye, even after the enactment of the Federal Rules, until the Court
clarified that the Federal Rules supersede Frye.16
Rules 702 through 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence govern expert
testimony.17 Rule 702 concerns Testimony by Experts generally and provides that:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert‘s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based
on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 18
Rule 704 governs Opinion on Ultimate Issue, which becomes relevant in
criminal cases such as Quick and Scott when experts seek to testify as to a
defendant‘s requisite intent to commit a particular crime. 19 Rule 704 provides,‖[i]n
a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the
defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element
of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.‖20
The Federal Rules still require that the judge ultimately decides whether or
not to admit the expert testimony, a role described as gatekeeping. 21 State courts
have their own rules of evidence, but many states have attempted to correlate their
rules with the federal rules both linguistically and numerically. 22
In 1993, the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Daubert completely restructured how
courts approached the admissibility of expert testimony. 23 In Daubert, the Court
delineated five factors for courts to consider in admitting expert testimony:
(1) whether the expert‘s technique or theory can be or has been tested
- that is, whether the expert‘s theory can be challenged in some
objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective,

16. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 598 (1993) (―[T]he Frye rule did not
survive the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.‖). Prior to the Court‘s ruling in Daubert, the
courts highly regarded Frye as the governing standard, with nearly 1000 cases between 1930 and 1993
directly citing the Frye rule. See Loevinger, supra note 11, at 157 n. 19.
17. FED. R. EVID. 702–706.
18. Id. at 702.
19. Id. at 704(b).
20. Id.
21. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee‘s note.
22. Tennessee, Texas, and Maryland are examples of states that have all adopted evidentiary rules
on expert testimony that mirror the Federal Rules. See, e.g., TENN. R. EVID. 7.02 (―Testimony By
Experts‖); TEX. R. EVID. 702 (―Testimony By Experts‖); MD. R. 5-702 (―Testimony By Experts‖).
23. See Heather G. Hamilton, Note, The Movement From Frye to Daubert: Where Do The States
Stand, 38 JURIMETRICS 201, 206 (1998) (describing Daubert as the ―coup de grace for those courts
seeking specific persuasive authority to discard Frye altogether‖).
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conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for
reliability; (2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to
peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error
of the technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence and
maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the technique
or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community. 24
Reflecting the multiplicity of advancements in the realm of science and
technology since the D.C. Court‘s 1923 ruling in Frye, the Supreme Court‘s
revolutionary ruling in Daubert catered to the joint needs of the scientific and legal
communities.25
While more than just the Frye and Daubert standards exist for admitting
expert testimony, state courts are generally divided over whether to follow Frye or
Daubert.26 Lawyers seeking to admit neuroscience evidence must navigate through
the federal rules and the varying state standards when attempting to introduce
expert witness testimony at trial.27
II. RECENT ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE NEUROSCIENCE EXPERT TESTIMONY
With the increasingly frequent use of neuroscience evidence in trial, 28 lawyers
must analyze the evidentiary standards of the respective federal or state court trying
their case. This part will examine two recent cases in which counsel sought to
introduce neuroscience evidence in mitigation of their client‘s intent to commit
murder and assault, respectively, and the court‘s subsequent admission or denial of
that evidence. Part A will discuss the 2011 Texas case Quick v. State, in which the
Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision to exclude
neuropsychological evidence on the accused‘s inability to form the requisite intent
for a murder conviction. 29 Part B will discuss the 2011 federal district court case

24. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee‘s note (referencing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
25. See Loevinger, supra note 11, at 158–59 (observing that at the time of the Frye ruling, 12,000
people answering the 1920 U.S. Census described themselves as a ―science, technical, or kindred
worker,‖ while this number jumped to 2.6 million by the 1990 census).
26. Hamilton, supra note 23, at 201. Two other recent Supreme Court cases have also had a major
impact on evidence admissibility: General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) and Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). See David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present,
and Future of the General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS 385, 386 (2001) (describing Daubert,
Joiner, and Kumho together as ―[t]he Supreme Court‘s expert evidence trilogy‖). While Joiner and
Kumho have played an important role in refining the standards for expert admissibility, analysts have
typically bifurcated the standards for expert testimony into the Frye and Daubert camps, grouping
Joiner and Kumho into one standard, sometimes labeled as ―Daubert and its progeny.‖ Id.
27. See Jones et al., supra note 5, ¶26 (noting the different scientific evidentiary standards across
jurisdictions).
28. See Jones et al., supra note 5, ¶1 (―It has become increasingly common for brain images to be
proffered as evidence in civil and criminal litigation.‖).
29. Quick v. State, No. 01-09-01127-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680 (Tex. App. Jan. 27, 2011).
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U.S. v. Scott, in which the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington admitted testimony from two experts who argued that the defendant
became temporarily insane due to involuntary intoxication as a defense to his
accused crime of assaulting two federal employees. 30
A. The Texas Approach to Neuropsychological Evidence
1. The Relevant Texas Evidentiary and Statutory Standards
Texas Rules of Evidence 702 through 704 govern the admissibility of expert
testimony.31 Rule 702 provides, ―[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.‖32
Texas Rule 704 (Opinion on Ultimate Issue) is identical to the Federal Rule, but
omits Part B of the Federal Rule, which prohibits an expert from testifying as to
whether a defendant possessed the requisite mental state for his alleged crime. 33 In
Quick v. State, the defendant‘s chief defense relied on his experts‘ opinions as to
whether the defendant possessed the requisite mental state for his alleged crime. 34
Texas follows the Daubert rule for the admissibility of expert scientific
testimony, as well as the similar reasoning from the 1992 Texas Criminal Court of
Appeals case Kelly v. State.35 In following Daubert and Kelly, the Supreme Court
of Texas added supplemental factors to its codified Rule 702 on the admissibility of
expert testimony.36 The Supreme Court of Texas mandated that the proffered
evidence relate to the case at bar, and that the scientific testimony has foundation in
reliable scientific theory.37 The Court listed all of the factors delineated by the
United States Supreme Court in Daubert for future Texas courts to consider when

30. U.S. v. Scott, No. CR-09-0131-EFS, 2011 WL 1327033 (E.D. Wash. April 7, 2011).
31. See TEX. R. EVID. 702–704.
32. TEX. R. EVID. 702. The Texas rule is identical—verbatim—to the federal rule, with the
exception that the Texas rule omits the three qualifying factors for admissibility included in the federal
rule. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
33. Compare TEX. R. EVID. 704, with FED. R. EVID. 704. Part B of the Federal Rule, which the
Texas rule omits, states ―[i]n a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether
the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime
charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.‖ Id.
34. See Quick v. State, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, *13–14 (Tex. App. 2011) (affirming the trial
court‘s decision to exclude the appellant‘s experts, who had proffered testimony that appellant‘s actions
were only reckless and failed to meet the requisite mental state to convict him of murder).
35. 824 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Kelly delineates seven factors for the
admissibility of expert testimony that generally incorporate the factors listed in Daubert. Id. at 573. In
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, the Supreme Court of Texas held: ―We are persuaded by
the reasoning in Daubert and Kelly.‖ 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995).
36. E.I. du Pont, 923 S.W.2d at 557.
37. E.I. du Pont, 923 S.W. 2d at at 556.
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evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony, and emphasized that courts are not
limited to the Daubert factors.38
Contrary to the Federal Rules, Texas allows a defendant to offer expert
testimony regarding his mental state in order to mitigate his conviction from
murder to manslaughter.39 Although not included in Texas Rule of Evidence 704,
Texas case law allows a defendant to offer evidence of his mental state at the time
of the alleged crime in order to refute the requisite mental state for his accused
crime.40 The expert testimony proffered in Quick sought to prove the defendant‘s
diminished executive functioning in his brain prevented him from forming the
requisite mental state for murder.41 To meet the requisite mental state for murder,
the accused must have the requisite mental state to ―intentionally or knowingly
[cause] the death of an individual‖ and to ―intend[] to cause serious bodily injury
and commit[] an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an
individual.‖42 In Quick, the defendant argued that his impaired executive
functioning prevented him from forming the requisite mental state at the time of his
alleged murder offense.43
2. Treatment of Expert Neuroscience Testimony in Quick
A Texas jury convicted James Irvin Quick of the murder of Michelle Denise
Mellton.44 Quick admitted to the murder in a videotaped custodial statement with
detectives.45 The jury found Quick guilty of murder and the trial court sentenced
him to fifteen years in prison. 46 Quick appealed, alleging that the trial court abused
its discretion by allowing the State to mention his failure to testify at trial during
the prosecution‘s closing argument and by barring Quick‘s three psychological and
psychiatric experts from testifying regarding his ability to form the requisite intent
to commit murder.47 The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and the
trial court‘s denial of his neuroscience experts.48

38. See id. at 557 (describing the Daubert factors as ―non-exclusive‖).
39. Compare FED. R. EVID. 704, with TEX. R. EVID. 704. See Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at
*9 (describing the Texas courts‘ approach to admitting relevant evidence to negate a defendant‘s
requisite mens rea, including a defendant‘s mental health history) (citing Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d
568, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Although Texas Rule of Evidence 704 has omitted the portion of
Federal Rule 704 regarding an expert‘s ability to opine on a defendant‘s requisite mental state, Jackson
allows such evidence on mental state. Id.
40. See Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 573–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (allowing evidence of a
defendant‘s mental health to negate the requisite mens rea).
41. Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at *6–*7.
42. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1)–(2).
43. Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at *6–*7.
44. Id. at *1–*3.
45. Id. at *2.
46. Id. at *3.
47. Id. at *1, *6.
48. Id. at *1.
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On the expert testimony issue, Quick contended that he could not form the
requisite intent for murder due to impaired executive functioning in his brain. 49 The
overwhelming evidence against him—including his own confession—precluded
any protestations of innocence.50 Instead, Quick claimed that the testimony of his
psychological and psychiatric experts, if believed by the jury, could have led him to
receive a lesser sentence for manslaughter rather than the harsher sentence for
murder.51
Prior to deciding whether to admit the testimony of the three experts proffered
by Quick, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of
the experts‘ testimony.52 Quick sought to present all three experts to testify on his
diminished executive functioning and the relationship between his neurological
impairment and his inability to form the requisite intent for murder. 53 Through the
experts, Quick sought to prove that he acted recklessly, which requires a lesser
mental capacity than a murder conviction requires under the Texas penal code. 54
During the hearing, Quick‘s attorney explained that if the Court admitted the
experts‘ testimony, Drs. Allen and Pollock would testify on the processes by which
they discovered Quick possessed diminished executive functioning as a means of
establishing a foundation for Dr. Self‘s testimony.55 If the Court admitted Dr. Self‘s

49. Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at *6–*7.
50. Id. at *2–*3.
51. Id. at *7. Texas law only requires for a manslaughter conviction that a person ―recklessly
causes the death of an individual.‖ There is no intent requirement as there is for murder. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.04(a). A person intends for an act to occur if the end result ―is his conscious objective
or desire.‖ TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a). Further, ―[a] person acts knowingly . . . with respect to a a
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.‖ TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(b).
52. Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at *10. The three defense experts were Drs. Thomas Allen,
Larry Pollock, and David Self. Id.
53. Id. at *10–*12. Dr. Self, in his report on Quick for the expert witness hearing, defined
executive functioning as a:
set of cognitive abilities that control and regulate other abilities and behaviors.
Executive functions are necessary for goal-oriented behavior. They include the ability to
initiate and stop actions, to monitor and change behavior as needed, and to plan future
behavior when faced with novel tasks and situations. Executive functions allow us to
anticipate outcomes.
Id. at *12.
54. Id. at *10–*11; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
55. Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at *10–*11. Dr. Pollock submitted a report concluding that
Quick‘s "neuropsychological evaluation revealed significant neurocognitive impairments. Deficits were
found in . . . executive functioning, [including] visual tracking and speed of auditory processing, [which]
. . . cause him to have problems in multitasking, planning and organization, and speed and flexibility of
thinking." Id. at *11–*12. Dr. Allen‘s medical report similarly concluded that "[w]hile functioning
within the normal limits of intelligence [Quick] is showing impairment in executive functioning and
working memory. He can be easily confused, especially under stressful circumstances." Id. at *11.
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testimony, he would testify that Quick‘s diminished executive functioning
prevented him from forming the requisite intent for murder. 56
After reviewing the experts‘ reports, the trial court concluded that the experts
failed to prove that Quick could not form the requisite intent for murder. 57 The trial
court held that the experts failed to adequately connect Quick‘s alleged diminished
executive functioning to an inability to form the necessary mental state to commit
murder, as required by the Texas evidentiary standard. 58 The court found that Dr.
Self‘s description of Quick‘s uncontrollable, confused mental state at the time of
the murder did not meet the state‘s statutory definition of reckless because Dr. Self
failed to demonstrate that Quick understood his actions and the consequences that
would result, and knowingly and deliberately ignored this risk. 59 The court also
held that Dr. Self failed to prove whether Quick had any knowledge that his actions
would cause his victim‘s death.60 The court ultimately concluded that the reports
submitted by Quick‘s experts failed to demonstrate that Quick acted only recklessly
and lacked the requisite mental state to commit murder.61 The court therefore
overruled Quick‘s appeal on the issue of the trial court‘s abuse of discretion in
rejecting the testimony of his neuroscience experts and affirmed the trial court‘s
ruling convicting Quick of murder.62

56. Id. at *12. In arguing in his report that Quick could not form the requisite intent for murder, Dr.
Self described Quick‘s ―already deficient executive brain function‖ as ―totally overwhelmed,‖ which
caused him ―to act recklessly with a temporary inability to abort his course of action and chose [sic]
from the available alternative courses appropriate to the situation.‖ Id. at *13.
57. Id. at *12–*13 (―The expert reports fail to show that appellant did not act intentionally or
knowingly, nor do they show that appellant acted recklessly.‖). The expert witness reports for this case
are not yet publicly available, so information on how the experts evaluated the defendant and reached
their conclusions can only be derived from the scant information contained in the Court‘s opinion. One
can surmise on the experts‘ research processes based on the available information on how the doctors
conduct their personal academic research. Dr. Larry Pollock, a neuropsychologist, typically evaluates his
patients through neuropsychological evaluations, mental status examinations, and a general diagnostic
battery.
Welcome
to
Project
ReEntry’s
Website,
PROJECT
REENTRY,
http://www.projectreentry.com/index.htm (last visited April 10, 2012). Dr. Pollock received his Ph.D. in
clinical psychology from Syracuse University and has been practicing in his specialty of
neuropsychiatry
for
thirty-five
years.
Company
Info,
PROJECT
REENTRY,
http://www.projectreentry.com/companyinfo.htm (last visited April 10, 2012). Dr. David Self, a
neurobiologist at the University of Texas Southwestern. David Self, Ph.D., FACULTY PROFILE, SW. MED.
CENTER, http://www.utsouthwestern.edu/findfac/research/0,2357,48661,00.html (last visited April 10,
2012). Dr. Self received his Ph.D. in pharmacology from the University of California at Irvine and
completed postdoctoral work at Yale University in the Division of Molecular Psychiatry. Id. His
multiple awards and publications, including Daniel H. Efron Award by the American College of
Neuropsychopharmacology, prove his competence in the field of neurobiology. Id.
58. See Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at *12–*14; see also supra notes 42–43 and
accompanying text.
59. Quick, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, at *12–*14.
60. Id. at *13.
61. Id. at *13–*14 (finding that the expert reports failed to prove that Quick only acted recklessly
and not with the knowing intention required for a murder conviction).
62. Id. at *14.
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B. The Washington Approach to Neuropsychological Evidence
1. The Relevant Evidentiary Standards
Washington Rules 702 and 704 on Testimony by Experts and Opinion on
Ultimate Issue, respectively, are identical to Texas Rules 702 and 704.63
Washington Rules 702 and 704 are relevant to an issue in United States v. Scott
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony and the experts‘ proffered testimony
on the ultimate issue of the defendant‘s requisite mental state.64 Washington
follows the Frye rule for the admissibility of expert testimony;65 however, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington tried the case at
bar,66 and as a result, the Court applied the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Daubert standard on expert testimony. 67 Trial courts are not required to adhere to
the Daubert factors in their entirety.68 As such, the Ninth Circuit, in United States
v. Hankey, added its own factors to Daubert.69 According to the Ninth Circuit, in
addition to the Daubert factors, a trial court may consider:
Whether the opinion is based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge; [w]hether the expert‘s opinion would
assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or
determining a fact in issue; [w]hether the expert has appropriate
qualifications - i.e., some special knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education on that subject matter; [w]hether the
testimony is relevant and reliable; [w]hether the methodology or
technique the expert uses ―fits‖ the conclusions; [and] [w]hether
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or undue consumption of
time.70

63. Compare WASH. R. EVID. 702 and 704, with TEXAS R. EVID. 702 and 704. The Washington
rule, like the Texas rule, does not include part B of the Federal Rule on Opinion on Ultimate Issue. Id.
64. U.S. v. Scott, No. CR-09-0131-EFS, 2011 WL 1327033, at *1 (E.D. Wash. April 7, 2011).
65. See Reese v. Stroh, 128 Wash. 2d 300, 306–7 (1995) (favoring Frye‘s general acceptance test
over the recently decided Daubert decision); see also Robert D. Leinbach, Novel Scientific Evidence
After Reese v. Stroh: The Washington Supreme Court’s Love Affair With Frye, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1127,
1127 (1996) (describing the firm holding of the Washington Supreme Court in Reese v. Stroh, that
Washington courts should follow the Frye rule in determining whether to admit expert scientific
evidence).
66. Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *1.
67. Id. at *2. The Court followed the federal Daubert standard rather than Washington‘s preferred
Frye standard because under the Erie Doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply
federal procedural law. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
68. U.S. v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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2. Treatment of Expert Neuroscience Evidence in Scott
On August 19, 2009, James Douglas Scott was admitted into the Veterans
Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) for excessive alcohol consumption with blood
alcohol content (BAC) of .38.71 Scott soon left his bed and refused Nurse
Hoffman‘s attempts to escort him back to his room for IV treatment. 72 In response,
Scott head butted Nurse Hoffman in his chest.73 As Nurse Hoffman struggled to
subdue Scott, Nurse Hoffman re-tore his rotator cuff.74 Later that evening, after
returning to his bed, Scott attacked Nurse Best, forcefully grabbing his neck and
kicking Nurse Best in his midsection. 75 The nurses eventually restrained Scott by
securing him to his bed with four-point restraints, under the orders of Scott‘s
doctor.76 On January 21, 2011, Scott was found guilty in a Ninth Circuit Federal
District Court of two counts of Assault by Inflicting Bodily Injury on Federal
Employees.77 On April 7, 2011, the Court denied Scott‘s Motion for New Trial and
Judgment of Acquittal.78
At trial, Scott‘s attorneys argued a temporary insanity defense to negate his
culpability for the alleged assault.79 As the crime of assault bars voluntarily
intoxication as a defense, Scott sought to prove that his Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) from his years as an Army Ranger caused him to become
involuntarily intoxicated on the night of the alleged incident. 80 Scott argued that his
involuntary intoxication rendered it impossible for him to formulate the requisite
general intent for an assault conviction. 81
Scott sought to introduce three defense experts to prove his insanity theory. 82
Scott retained his first expert, Dr. Stanulis, to argue that patients suffering from

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure §12(2)(b) governs the requisite notice of expert
testimony on the insanity defense. 18 U.S.C. § 17 governs the insanity defense to federal prosecution.
80. Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2. Involuntary intoxication only occurs if the defendant is
entirely unable ―to resist taking the first sip.‖ Id. at *5. In United States v. Vela, the Ninth Circuit held
that ―[V]oluntary intoxication is not a defense to a general intent crime‖ and that 18 U.S.C. ―§111
[Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain Officers or Employees] is a general intent crime.‖ 624 F.3d
1148 (9th Cir. 2010).
81. Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2. Symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder include
―episodes of repeated reliving of the trauma in intrusive memories or ‗flashbacks‘ or dreams, which
occur against the persisting background of a sense of ‗numbness‘ and emotional blunting, detachment
from other people, unresponsiveness to surroundings, anhedonia, and avoidance of activities and
situations reminiscent of the trauma.‖ STEPHEN JOSEPH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING POST-TRAUMATIC
STRESS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PTSD AND TREATMENT 17 (1997).
82. Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2.
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PTSD will unintentionally self-medicate with alcohol to suppress the memory of
their traumatic experience.83 Scott retained Dr. Julien to prove that an individual
with a blood alcohol level as high as Scott‘s on the night of the alleged incident
could not have formed the requisite intent to commit assault. 84 Finally, Scott
retained Dr. Brown to prove that his experience as an Army Ranger caused him to
instinctively and involuntarily attack Nurses Hoffman and Best in reaction to his
perception of the nurses as a threat to his safety. 85 The trial court held three
Daubert hearings on the admissibility of the experts‘ testimony and ultimately
admitted testimony from Drs. Stanulis and Julien and denied testimony from Dr.
Brown.86
Prior to the Daubert evidentiary hearings, Dr. Stanulis provided the trial court
with a detailed notice describing his potential testimony and containing his
curriculum vitae.87 Dr. Stanulis‘s qualifications include his private medical practice
where he specializes in clinical psychology and neuropsychology. 88 Dr. Stanulis
based his opinions in this case on his wide-ranging experience in the field, his
personal interviews with Scott, and a thorough review of Scott‘s medical history.89
While the court has not made Dr. Stanulis‘s report publicly available, Scott‘s
counsel stated in a motion to the Court that Dr. Stanulis rendered his opinion
through ―accepted methodologies and standards.‖90 The Court admitted Dr.
Stanulis‘s testimony,91 over the Government‘s objections that he did not base his
opinions on ―sufficient facts or data.‖92
Dr. Mark Mays submitted a report regarding the effect of alcohol upon a
patient suffering from PTSD.93 In his report, Dr. Mays explained that alcohol may
have a greater effect on the executive functioning of a person with PTSD than on a

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Defendant‘s Memorandum in Response to Gov‘t‘s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and
Testimony and to Determine the Admissibility of Expert Testimony at 2, 4, United States v. Scott, No.
2.09-CR-00131-EFS (E.D.Wash. July 1, 2010).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 8 (―[Dr. Stanulis] has served in several prestigious academic and clinical positions as
well as working in the Veterans Administration Medical Center in Allen Park, Michigan.‖).
90. Id. at 11.
91. Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2.
92. Memorandum in Support Gov‘t‘s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and Testimony and
for Evidentiary Hearing to Determine the Admissibility of Expert Testimony at 6–7, United States v.
Scott, No. 2.09-CR-00131-EFS (E.D.Wash. June 24, 2010).
93. Defendant‘s Memorandum in Response to Gov‘t‘s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and
Testimony and to Determine the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, supra note 83, at 3. Dr. Mays did
not meet with Scott, so his report reflects his knowledge and research in the field rather than a case study
personalized to Scott‘s situation. Id. at 8. The defense did not proffer Dr. Mays as an expert in this case.
Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2.
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person not afflicted by this condition. 94 Dr. Mays further submitted that this
diminished executive functioning can lead to diminished self-control and
comprehension, as well as an instinctually aggressive and excessive response to
behavior perceived as invading the patient‘s personal space.95
Dr. Julien submitted a report detailing his qualifications, his opinions on the
case, and the medical basis for his opinions. 96 Dr. Julien‘s qualifications include his
M.S. and Ph.D. in Pharmacology and his medical degree. 97 He has also published
multiple editions of a textbook on psychopharmacology, frequently delivers
lectures on the subject, and often serves as a court-qualified expert on the topic.98
Dr. Julien testified in his affidavit that in addition to the excessive alcohol Scott
consumed on the evening of the alleged incident and on the days preceding the
alleged incident, Scott ingested prescribed benzodiazepine tranquilizers to relieve
stress caused by his PTSD.99 The combination of the alcohol and the tranquilizer,
according to Dr. Julien, prevented Scott from having any memory of the alleged
assault, and this inability to form memory related to an inability to form intent, as
both resulted from a diminished executive functioning.100 Dr. Julien concluded that
―[i]t is clear here, to a degree of medical certainty, that (with no memory and a
BAC of 0.38 grams% (and a BAC likely above 0.30 grams% three hours later) [sic]
intentional actions cannot be formulated.‖101 Dr. Julien explained that Scott was in
a state of ―organic dementia‖ where ―the ability to judge consequences of one‘s
actions, and in essence the ability to act with any degree of executive or intellectual
functioning is lost.‖102 The Court admitted the testimony of Dr. Julien,103 and
overruled the State‘s objections that Dr. Julien did not base his opinions on
―sufficient facts or data.‖104

94. Affidavit of Mark Mays, PhD, JD at 6, United States v. Scott, No. 2.09-CR-00131-EFS
(E.D.Wash. Feb. 10, 2010) (―[A]lcohol intoxication may result in an even more profound deterioration
and impairment in functioning in a person with post traumatic stress disorder than with a more normally
functioning individual.‖).
95. Id. at 6–7 (―[T]here is both a likelihood of an excessive response due to PTSD, and the
likelihood of a disinhibited and more unthinking and instinctual response, as might occur with alcohol
intoxication.‖).
96. Affidavit of Dr. Robert M. Julien, MD, PhD at 1–2, United States v. Scott, No. 2.09-CR00131-EFS (E.D.Wash Feb. 10, 2010).
97. Id. at 1.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1–2. Dr. Julien noted that the tranquilizers taken by Scott ―act in a manner identical to
that of alcohol.‖ Id. at 2.
100. Id. at 1–2.
101. Id. at 2.
102. Id.
103. United States v. Scott, No. CR-09-0131-EFS, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2 (E.D. Wash. April 7,
2011).
104. Memorandum in Support Gov‘t‘s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and Testimony and
for Evidentiary Hearing to Determine the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, supra note 87, at 6.
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Dr. Brown also submitted a report detailing his qualifications and opinions on
the case.105 His qualifications included past expert testimony in criminal cases
involving veterans; his background as a sociologist; his multiple publications in
books and peer-reviewed journals on the Military Total Institution; and his military
service during the Vietnam War.106 Moreover, Dr. Brown specializes in military
training processes, the sociological effect of military training on the trainees, and
the correlation between PTSD and the commission of criminal offenses. 107 Dr.
Brown interviewed Scott four times for an approximate total of fifteen hours, where
he relied on more than one thousand pages of material on the transition of
servicemen from the military to civilian life and that transition‘s impact on their
future criminality.108 Dr. Brown concluded that Scott ―appears to have been
reacting to a perceived threatening situation where he instantaneously reacted in a
manner in which he had been trained in the military. His infantry training amplified
by airborne and Ranger School training provided the means for an instant response
to perceived threats.‖109 The State objected to Brown‘s testimony, arguing that his
opinion on Scott‘s diminished capacity was not relevant to the requisite general
intent for Scott‘s accused assault crime and that Dr. Brown did not base his
conclusions on ―sufficient facts or data.‖110 The Court subsequently rejected
Brown‘s testimony.111
Although the Court admitted testimony from two of Scott‘s experts
supporting his insanity defense, a jury still found Scott guilty of assault on both
counts.112 On April 7, 2011, U.S. District Court Judge Edward F. Shea rejected
Scott‘s Motion for New Trial and Judgment of Acquittal. 113
III. ANALYSIS OF THE VARIATION IN EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY UNDER DAUBERT
A. Comparison of the Quick and Scott Evidentiary Rulings
In both Quick and Scott, the defendants sought to introduce testimony
negating the requisite intent for their convictions resulting from their diminished

105. Affidavit of William B. Brown, PhD, United States v. Scott, No. 2.09-CR-00131-EFS
(E.D.Wash Feb. 9, 2010) (detailing his expert witness foundation).
106. Id.
107. Id. Dr. Brown describes the Military Total Institution as ―the sociological study of individuals
who are recruited from a civilian culture and who are bureaucratically and systematically processed
through the military institution, largely isolated from civilian contact and influences.‖ Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Gov‘t‘s Argument in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Dr.
William Brown at 2–3, United States v. Scott, No. 2.09-CR-00131-EFS (E.D.Wash. Sept. 29, 2010).
111. United States v. Scott, No. CR-09-0131-EFS, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2 (E.D. Wash. April 7,
2011).
112. Id. at *1.
113. Id.

WAGENHEIM.APPENDIX

S-14

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 15:Supp.

executive functioning.114 In Quick, the Texas trial court excluded Quick‘s expert
neuroscience witnesses and the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s
decision.115 By comparison, in Scott, the federal district court allowed testimony
from two of the defendant‘s neuroscience experts, but rejected testimony from the
third expert, whose testimony focused on sociological evidence rather than
neuroscience evidence.116 Both Texas and the federal courts follow the Daubert
standard, and both share an identical evidentiary rule for the admissibility of expert
testimony under Texas Rule 702 and Federal Rule 702.117 Federal Rule 704 and
Texas Rule 704 differ in that the federal rule explicitly prohibits experts from
testifying on a defendant‘s mental capacity to commit a crime, while the Texas rule
omits this point.118 Despite their similar evidentiary standards, the Texas trial court
and the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Washington differed in their
admissibility of neuroscience expert testimony in Quick and Scott.119
The Texas Court in Quick rejected the neuroscience experts‘ testimony on the
effect of the defendant‘s diminished executive functioning on his ability to form the
requisite intent for murder because the Court found that the submitted experts‘
reports did not support the testimony they proffered. 120 Dr. Allen determined that
Quick‘s diminished executive functioning caused him to become ―easily
confused‖.121 Dr. Pollock determined that Quick‘s executive functioning caused
him to ―have problems in multitasking, planning and organization, and speed and
flexibility of thinking;‖122 and Dr. Self determined that Quick‘s diminished
executive functioning caused him to be ―momentarily unable to abort his course of
action and chose [sic] from the available alternative courses appropriate to the
situation.‖123 All of these factors would seem to indicate a neurological inability to
form the requisite intent for murder, and yet the Court concluded that the proffered
testimony did not support such a conclusion.124 The Court did not focus on any of
the Daubert factors in reaching its conclusion, nor did it focus upon the reliability
of the experts‘ testimony and the sufficiency of the techniques they used to reach

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See supra notes 49, 79–81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17–25, 31–38 and accompanying text.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Texas case law now allows testimony on a
defendant‘s mental state. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
119. See supra Part II.
120. Quick v. State, No. 01-09-01127-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 680, *13–14 (Tex. App. Jan. 27,
2011).
121. Id. at *11.
122. Id. at *11–12.
123. Id. at *12.
124. Id. at *13–14 (holding that the expert reports did not support the defendant‘s proffered
neuropsychological defense).
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their conclusions.125 Instead, the Court simply concluded that the experts, despite
the depth and breadth of their academic experience in the field, did not support
their argument that the defendant could not form the requisite intent to commit
murder, without allowing the jury to draw its own inferences from the experts‘
conclusions.126
In Scott, the Court admitted two of the defense‘s neuroscience experts, despite
the prosecution‘s objections that the experts failed to base their opinions on
―sufficient facts or data.‖127 Contrary to the prosecution‘s contentions, the defense‘s
experts based their conclusions on the defendant‘s medical history and the experts‘
research in the field.128 Following three Daubert evidentiary hearings, the Court
established ―clear parameters‖ as to the subjects on which two of the defense‘s
three proffered experts could testify. 129
Two Daubert courts operating under similar evidentiary standards reached
different rulings on testimony from highly credentialed experts seeking to prove
that a defendant‘s diminished executive functioning prevented him from forming
the requisite intent to commit a particular crime. 130 Such disparate results reflect a
complete lack of uniformity in Daubert‘s application.
B. The Judiciary’s Confusion Over Daubert’s Application
The divergence in the approaches of the Texas and Federal District Courts on
the admissibility of the expert testimony results from the problems that have
stemmed from the Court‘s ruling in Daubert. Daubert created confusion for the
courts in determining whether to admit expert scientific testimony. 131 Some
attribute this confusion to the flexible nature of the Daubert factors in their
allowing judges the option of following either one or all of the factors.132 Because
of Daubert‘s malleability, judges do not apply the Daubert factors uniformly.133
The lack of uniformity in the application of Daubert has led to unpredictability in

125. See id.
126. Id.; see also supra note 57.
127. United States v. Scott, No. CR-09-0131-EFS, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2 (E.D. Wash. April 7,
2011); see also supra notes 91–92, 103–104 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 87–90, 96–98, 105–108 and accompanying text.
129. Scott, 2011 WL 1327033, at *2–3.
130. See supra Part II.
131. Cassandra H. Welch, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert's Legacy of Confusion,
29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1085, 1094–95 (1995) (describing the ―fundamental tension on
admissibility‖ created by the Daubert decision).
132. Id. (noting the irony of the inconsistent ruling as a result of Daubert when the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to Daubert in order to remedy perceived inconsistencies).
133. Id. at 1096 (concluding that the courts‘ varying approaches to Daubert is ―in line with the
‗liberal thrust‘ of the Federal Rules‖).
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the courts‘ interpretation of its factors because the courts lack comprehensive,
mandatory requirements.134
Daubert grants a high level of deference to the judges in determining when to
admit expert testimony, which has given judges the freedom to follow Daubert in a
manner of their choosing and has contributed to the disparate treatment of
neuroscience evidence among the courts. 135 An independent study of four hundred
randomly selected state court judges reflects the variance in judges‘ approaches to
Daubert.136 The study sought to measure the disparities in courts‘ interpretations of
Daubert by polling the judges on their perception of Daubert‘s role and intended
application.137 The study found that thirty-two percent of the responding judges
believed that Daubert raised the standards for the admissibility of expert testimony,
while twenty-three percent believed that Daubert lowered admissibility
standards.138 Thirty-six percent of the responding judges believed that Daubert did
not change the standard for admissibility, and the remaining eleven percent had not
yet determined Daubert‘s impact.139 The survey also found ―little consensus‖ in the
manner in which the judges balanced and combined the Daubert factors.140 The
survey demonstrates the confusion Daubert has generated among judges;141 with
such documented variation in the perceptions of judges, the divergence in the
approaches of the Texas and federal district courts in Quick and Scott seems to
naturally comport with the national trend. 142
Daubert‘s deference to judges in admitting expert testimony requires the
judges to have a comprehension of complex scientific data that may exceed their
capabilities.143 Forcing judges to navigate through complicated, unfamiliar
neurological data to determine admissibility only compounds the variation in the
application of Daubert because many judges have no background or formal training

134. Id.
135. Id. (describing the ―highly deferential standard of review . . . and the courts‘ application of
varying standards and tests‖).
136. Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging
Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 443 (2001).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 453.
141. Id.
142. More than five years after the Supreme Court decided Daubert, forty percent of Texas judges
admitted to not having read this pivotal decision, which may also contribute to their confusion over
Daubert’s role. Cynthia S. Kent, Daubert Readiness of Texas Judiciary: A Study of the Qualifications,
Experience, and Capacity of the Members of the Texas Judiciary to Determine the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony under the Daubert, Kelly, Robinson, and Havner Tests, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1,
16, 18 (1999).
143. Welch, supra note 131, at 1096 (―Daubert requires judges to have scientific knowledge and to
apply that knowledge to the facts of each case.‖).
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in the field.144 Lay judges‘ inexperience with scientific information thwarts their
ability to accurately evaluate proffered testimony for Daubert compliance.145 Many
judges avoid science because they do not understand science, which may have
negative implications for attorneys‘ attempts at introducing neuroscience
evidence.146
The neuroscience evidence in Quick and Scott succumbed to the whims of the
gatekeeper judges to determine admissibility. Despite the similarities between the
neuroscience evidence from the two cases, what the evidence sought to prove, and
the respective evidentiary standards for admissibility, the Texas trial court excluded
neuropsychological testimony and the federal district court admitted neuroscience
testimony on the intent issue, although the juries ultimately found both defendants
guilty.147 Daubert granted judges flexibility in their admissibility of expert
testimony;148 the contrasting approaches of the Texas and Federal District Courts
reflect this judicial deference and the diverging opinions generated as a result. 149

144. See Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific
Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 716–17 (1993) (analogizing judges‘ and lawyers‘ discomfort with
science to ―a child about to get a tetanus shot. They know it‘s painful and believe it‘s necessary, but
haven‘t the foggiest idea how or why it works‖).
145. Gatowski et al., supra note 132, at 452–54.
146. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific
Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 58 (1998) (postulating that ―courts continue to evade the science issues‖
and that ―judges are turning a blind eye to the science involved in the evidence before them‖).
Moreover, applying novel neuroscience principles to traditional common law offenses that long predated
the scientific advancements poses challenges to judges when evaluating the admissibility of evidence.
See Brent Garland & Paul W. Glimcher, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Law, 16 CURRENT OPINIONS
NEUROBIOLOGY 130, 130 (2006) (―These physiological insights will challenge, in turn, legal systems
that rest on conceptual bases that are often hundreds of years old.‖). These challenges result, in part,
from the innate differences between science and the law. Id. at 131. Science relies on a more meticulous,
longer process of truth seeking that may span decades before reaching a definitive answer, whereas the
law demands immediate answers and cannot afford to wait for the testing of every possible variable. See
id. (explaining that ―the rules of evidence do not require perfection — only relevance‖). Additionally,
the litigation system requires definitive answers and denies experts the opportunity to expound upon
potential uncertainties and caveats to their theories. Joseph Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1559–1560 (2007) (quoting MARK A. CHESLER ET AL., SOCIAL SCIENCE IN
COURT: MOBILIZING EXPERTS IN THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES 115 (1988)). One expert witness
in a school desegregation case commented that ―[I]t is not the role of the witness to define the case, to
call attention to everything that could possibly be said about a subject . . . I guess I accepted the idea that
I am serving one side and that resolved potential conflicts.‖ Id. at 1560.
147. See supra Part II.
148. See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text.
149. Cf. Judith A. Hasko, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Flexible Judicial
Screening of Scientific Expert Evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 479,
495 (1995) (describing the Daubert decision as a ―[departure] from the Court‘s general trend toward
plain meaning jurisprudence‖).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Neuroscience evidence has not yet reached the point where courts can admit
expert testimony carte blanche, but as a result of Daubert‘s flexible standards,
courts in different districts do not treat similar evidence uniformly. 150 As Quick v.
State and United States v. Scott illustrate, two courts applying similar evidentiary
standards to neuropsychological evidence of intent to commit a crime may regard
the evidence unequally.151 As neuroscience evidence advances to the point where it
may one day transform criminal litigation, the law should advance along with it by
adhering to a definitive set of evidentiary standards beyond the flexible Daubert
factors in order to restore predictability and fairness to the process of evidence
admissibility.

150. See Rosen, supra note 4 (suggesting that neuroscience evidence is not yet ripe enough to
―identify the mysterious point at which people should be excused from responsibility for their actions
because they are not able, in some sense, to control themselves,‖ but that the emerging field of neurolaw
is continuously advancing).
151. See supra Part II.

